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ǣǯ. By Jeff 
Jackson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 306p.  
Matthew Festenstein, University of York 
 
Why Dewey now? In this sophisticated presentation, Jeff Jackson provides a robust 
answer. Dewey is often viewed as a historical progenitor of deliberative conceptions of 
democracy, with some reason. However, this is a very limited interpretation, and for 
Jackson, Dewey is really a proponent of a form of participatory democracy that takes 
societal inequalities far more seriously than deliberative theory has been able to.  This 
is important because ǲǡǯto overcome that 
inequality and how an overemphasis on political debate can distract us from this urgent ǳȋp. 4).  
There is of course a massive supporting empirical literature on the distortions 
that wealth and inequality impose on capitalist democracies, and the example Jackson 
draws on several times is the conspicuous intervention of the Koch brothers in the 
political struggle over collective bargaining rights (and the gubernatorial election) in 
Wisconsin in 2011.  Dewey provides a theory of specifically participatory democracy 
which sees social inequality as the most pressing and central problem, pushing to the 
margins more recent procedurally oriented conceptions of democracy that focus on 
deliberation or agonism. Rather, democracy is non-procedural and involves taking sides 
in procedural disputes Ȃ some sides in an argument are oligarchic, others democratic; ǯǡ
compromise.  We must associate democracy with outcomes that benefit the 
disadvantaged rather than with deliberative discussion or agonǣǲǯǳǡ
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Jackson acidly observesǡǲǳȋp. 212).  Indeed, some sorts of 
coercive practice, such as strikes, should be understood as democratic, even if they ǯǡ
action toward overcoming inequality. ǲ agonistic thinkers 
attempt to simply say that society should be equal and keep their focus on proper 
political debate, they are failing to theorize the most essential work involved in ǳȋp.  ?ȌǤǲ  no tolerance 
for this kind of wishing away of our most pressing problem, and it instead forces us to ǳȋp. 196). Further, following recent 
interpreters such as Marc Stears and John Medearis, he sees Dewey as committed to 
non-deliberative and potentially coercive forms of political action in circumstances of 
deep structural inequality: the protesters near the homes of Wisconsin Governor Scott ǯons of 
deliberative democracy but nevertheless (Jackson argues) their actions should be 
understood as democratic.   
 The argument about the contribution of Dewey to transforming democratic 
theory is a comprehensive, nuanced and systematic interpretation as a radical that 
takes us beyond intramural debates in scholarship on Dewey and political theory and in 
theorising deliberative democracy. This is a rich and engaging text for Dewey 
aficionados, and an excellent jumping-off point for the tentatively Dewey-curious 
political theorist. ǯǯǡ
unlikely figure of Plato as a foil for the discussion: yet Jackson caǲǳ
movement,  and sees in The Republic a very Deweyan project of constructing a form of 
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individuality consonant with the objective conditions of its era. Of course, the form of 
individuality consonant with modern industrial societies is radically un-Platonic, 
pluralistic, mutable and egalitarian. The following chapter is also framed in relation to a 
superficially more plausible but also sharply distinct interlocutor, Hegel. (Although 
Jackson mentions the sigǤǤ
ǯǡǯǤȌ
as a springboard to discuss the problem of undemocratic work as well as to clarify some 
important differences between Dewey and Richard Rorty. Jackson builds on this  
Hegelian reading to defend Dewey as a radical institutional and political thinker, against 
political theorists like Sheldon Wolin for whom radical democracy is inherently 
opposed to institutionalisation. He makes a helpful and detailed case for the ǯǤǯ
educational theory in his political philosophy, often a difficult area for clear analysis.  
 Dewey provides a compelling alternative to the deliberative paradigm because ǲȏȐ
they prevent individuǳȋp. 13). ǲ	ǡ
principally defined by individuals participating in the governance of their lives, or, ǳȋp. 12). 	ǡǯ view of democracy as a 
social iǡǡǲǡ
developing conception of democracy, one that is constituted by individual, social, and ǳ
(p. 265). Multiple, interrelated strands combine to make up democracy, including 
democratic workplace relations and education. Deliberative theorists ignore or 
subordinate these relationships. 
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 This is likely to provoke a response from some deliberative and agonistic ǡǡǯ
they say about the necessary conditions for democratic politics. But this review ǯ
presentation designed to appease skeptics about the very expansive conception of ǯǤHere I want only to 
suggest another type of question. ǡǯǯs thought, features 
about which Dewey himself ǯ, namely, his liberalism and his 
socialism. Dewey is loudly committed to a liberal conception of individual freedom; in 
particular, positive liberty. Perhaps because he feels that this is an excessively ǡǯit. But ǯs important that ǯcommitment to democratic individualism and his scathing analysis of 
liberalism as a bankrupt ideology of capitalist exploitation was made in the name of a 
better liberalism. 	ǡǯcritique of ǲdominationǳis married to a desire to 
move beyond market forms of organisation, which he explores through forms of 
pluralism as well as socialism. He famously contrasts a democratic planning economy 
and an undemocratic planned one Ȃ but his point is that a planning economy is planned. 
Dewey was vague about institutions, but, as Jackson emphasises, emphatic that 
institutions were important, and what he was principally vague about was how state ȋǯȌȂ the 
recognition of unions was part of this. What Dewey sees as the radical nisus of his work 
is less the accommodation of direct action, civil disobedience and coercion as a means 
than the authority of democratic social and economic planning. While ǯ
statements about direct action are ambivalent and contextual, the dominant note seems 
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to be the well-ǡǲȏȐ
voluntary activities of individuals in opposition to coercion; they are assent and consent 
in opposition to violence; they are the force of intelligence organization versus the force ǳȋǲǳ[1937], in Jo Ann 
Boydston (ed.) John Dewey: The Later Works 1925-1953, vol. 11 [1987]: 298). The 
tension between this and the position Jackson ascribes to Dewey still seems live and in Ǥǯǯsocieties 
but does not quite put its subject matter beyond debate.   
 
 
 
 
 
